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Comparative Bullet lead Analysis: A
Retrospective
Paul C. Giannelli*
For over thirty years, FBI experts testified about comparative bullet
lead analysis (CBLA), a technique that was first used in the investigation into President Kennedy's assassination. 1 CBLA compares trace
chemicals found in bullets at crime scenes with ammunition found in
the possession of a suspect. 2 This technique was used by the FBI
when firearms ("ballistics") identification could not be employed-for
example, if the weapon was not recovered or the bullet was too
mutilated for comparison purposes.
·
Although the FBI eventually ceased using CBLA, the Bureau's
conduct in first employing the technique and then defending it after it
was challenged provides an insight into how forensic science
sometimes works.
A. The Technique
FBI experts used various analytical techniques (first, neutron activation analysis (NAA), and then inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES)) to determine the concentrations of seven
elements-arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and
cadmium-in the bullet lead alloy of both the crime-scene and
suspect's bullets. Statistical tests were then used to compare the elements in each bullet and determine whether the fragments and
suspect's bullets were "analytically indistinguishable" for each of the
elemental concentration means. Exactly what the phrase "analytically
indistinguishable" meant was the critical issue-i.e., did such a finding
mean that the bullet fragments came from a small or large universe?
The probative value of the test results would, of course, differ if only a
hundred bullets had the same chemical composition as opposed to
several million bullets.
*Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University. This column is based in part on P. Giannelli & E.
lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence (4th ed. 2007). Reprinted with permission.
1

See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the JFK
Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical Perspectives, 51
J. Forensic Sci. 717 (2006) (discussing the original analysis of the bullet fragments).

~he overwhelming majority of cases were homicide prosecutions, some of
which were capital cases. Because there are few federal homicide statutes, CBLA
evidence was most commonly used in state prosecutions.
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B.

The Challenge
The technique was not seriously challenged until a retired FBI
examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific
and legal journals 3 and in court testimony as well. 4 These challenges
apparently lead one FBI expert, Kathleen Lundy, to testify falsely. In
Commonwealth v. Ragland, 5 a Kentucky murder case, she stated at a
pretrial admissibility hearing that the elemental composition of a .243
caliber bullet fragment removed from the victim's body was analytically
indistinguishable from bullets found at the home of the defendant's
parents. 6 Lundy further testified that the Winchester Company
purchased its bullet lead in block form prior to 1996 and then remelted
it at its manufacturing plant. However, during cross-examination at
trial, Lundy admitted that she knew prior to the pretrial hearing that
Winchester had purchased its lead in billet form in 1994.7 This was
not a minor point. Millions more bullets could have the same "source"
if they were last melted by a secondary smelter instead of by
Winchester. 8 Lundy subsequently admitted to her superiors that she
had lied, 9 and on June 17, 2003, she pleaded guilty to testifying falsely
3

See Edward J. lmwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 43
(2003); Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead
Compositional Analysis, 127 Forensic Sci. lnt'l 174 (2002) (Tobin was a coauthor);
William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative is Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis?, 17 Grim. Just. 26 (Fall 2002).
4

E.g., Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons v. State, 392
Md. 339, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070 (2006); State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super. 409, 868 A.2d
329, 339-40 (App. Div. 2005) (Tobin's affidavit submitted). Although a metallurgist,
Tobin worked in a different section of the lab.
5

Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006).

6

See Dan Eggen, FBI Lab Moves to New Home, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 2003, at
A21; New Allegations Target DNA, Bullet Analysis at FBI Lab, Associated Press, Apr.
23, 2003 ("Weeks after testifying at a court hearing in a Kentucky murder, FBI
scientist Kathleen Lundy told her superiors a secret. She knowingly gave false
testimony about her specialty of lead bullet analysis."); Joseph Gerth, Ragland
Prosecutor Can Stay on Case, Courier-Journal, Oct. 19, 2002, at 1B.
7

Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 580 ("During cross-examination at trial, Lundy admitted that her testimony at the Daubert hearing was false and that she knew prior to the
Daubert hearing that Winchester purchased its bullet lead in billets in 1994. Her only
explanation for her false testimony was that she had misunderstood the question.
When defense counsel read the questions and answers to her from a transcript, she
asserted that she could not remember if that was, in fact, her testimony.").
8

Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 576-77.

9

See Charles Pillar & Robin Mejia, Science Casts Doubt on FBI's Bullet Evidence,
L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2003 ("In a sworn affidavit, she admitted that her trial testimony
was untruthful and that the manufacturing batch was many times larger than she had
© 2011 Thomson Reuters e Criminal Law Bulletin e Vol. 47 No. 2
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and was sentenced to a suspended ninety-day jail sentence and a
$250 fine. 10
As a result of Tobin's testimony, the FBI asked the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the technique. NAS appointed a
committee of scientists, statisticians, and attorneys to conduct the
review. 11
C.

The NAS Report
One of the first things the NAS Committee discovered was the
disparate (often inconsistent) interpretive conclusions provided by FBI
experts in the reported cases. In some, experts testified only that two
exhibits were "analytically indistinguishable." 12 In other cases, examiners concluded that samples could have come from the same "source"
or "batch." 13 In still others, they stated that the samples came from the
same source. 14 The testimony in numerous cases went much further
and referred to a "box" of ammunition. For example, tWo specimens:
• Could have come from the same box, 15
• Could have come from the same box or a box manufactured on
the same day, 16
• Were consistent with their having come from the same box of
ammunition, 17
suggested. . . . Lundy blamed her conduct partly on a sense of crisis in her work, fed
by 'new and repeated challenges to the validity of the science associated with bullet
lead comparison analysis.' ").
10

Mark Pitsch, Ex-FBI Scientist Pleads Guilty, Courier-Journal, June 18, 2003, at
1B. See also Steve Bailey, Defense Attorneys Want Prosecutors Disqualified, Associated Press, Sept. 6, 2002 ("Attorneys for both sides were in court for a hearing in
which FBI ballistics expert Kathleen Lundy was scheduled to testify about lying during
a preliminary hearing in Shane Ragland's murder case."); Maurice Possley, Study
Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis by FBI, Chi. Trib., Feb. 11,2004, at C14.
11

National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Forensic Analysis:
Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 6 (2004). The author served on the NAS Committee.
12

See Wilkerson v. State, 139 Md. App. 557, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (2001).

13

See State v. Krummacher, 269 Or. 125, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (1974).

14

See U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673-74, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir.
1996); People v. Lane, 256 Ill. App. 3d 38, 195 Ill. Dec. 218, 628 N.E.2d 682, 689-90
(1st Dist. 1993).
15

See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State,
425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981).
16

See State v. Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (1994); People v.
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 102 Ill. Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (1986).
17

See State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534, 31 A.L.R.4th 473

(1982).
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• Probably came from the same box, 18 and
• Must have come from the same box or from another box that
would have been made by the same company on the same day. 19
Testimony that two specimens came from the same box of ammunition (usually 50 loaded cartridges, sometimes 20) is powerful evidence.
Several other (and different) statements appear in the published
opinions. An early case reported that the specimens "had come from
the same batch of ammunition: they had been made by the same
manufacturer on the same day and at the same hour." 20 One case
reports the expert's conclusion with a statistic. 21 In another case, the
expert used the expressions "rare finding" 22 and "a very rare finding." 23
In still another case, the expert "opined that the same company
produced the bullets at the same time, using the same lead source.
Based upon Department of Justice records, she opined that an
overseas company called PMC produced the bullets around 1982."24
These inconsistencies suggest that the FBI laboratory was not
monitoring the trial testimony of its experts.
The publication of the NAS Report in 2004 undercut much of this
testimony. According to the report, "The available data do not support
any statement that a crime bullet came from a particular box of
ammunition. ln particular, references to 'boxes' of ammunition in any
18

.

See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360, 1997 OK CR 15 (Okla. Grim. App.

1997).
19

See U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666-67, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir.
1996) ("An expert testified that such a finding is rare and that the bullets must have
come from the same box or from another box that would have been made by the
same company on the same day."); Com. v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 587 N.E.2d 194,
207 (1992); State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (2001) (Kathleen
Lundy "opined that, based on her lead analysis, the bullets she examined either came
from the same box of cartridges or came from different boxes of the same caliber,
manufactured at the same time.").
20
21

22
23

Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added).
Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991).
U.S. v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 666, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 189 (8th Cir. 1996).

Davis, 103 F.3d at 667.

24

People v. Vil/arta, 2002 WL 66887 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2002) (murder). In
recent years, the testimony became more limited. A 2002 FBI publication states the
conclusion as follows: "Therefore, they likely originated from the same manufacturer's
source (melt) of lead." Charles A. Peters, The Basis for Compositional Bullet Lead
Comparisons, 4 Forensic Sci. Comm. No. 3, at 5 (July 2002) (emphasis added).
Testimony to the same effect has also been proffered. Testimony of Charles Peters,
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002, Transcript (trial testimony): "Well,
bullets that are analytically indistinguishable likely come from the same molten lead
sources of lead, uh, as opposed to bullets that have different composition come from
different, uh, melts of lead."
© 2011 Thomson Reuters ;; Criminal Law Bulletin e Vol. 47 i'lo. 2

309

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

form should be avoided as misleading under Federal Rule of Evidence
403. " 25 The most disturbing case is State v. Earhart, 26 a capital murder
case in which the CBLA evidence apparently played a significant
role. 27 The transcript contains the following expert testimony: "We
can-from my 21 years experience of doing bullet lead analysis and
doing research on boxes of ammunition down though the years I can
determine if bullets came from the same box of ammunition . . ." 28
However, according to the NAS Committee the amount of bullets that
can be produced from a melt "can range from the equivalent of as few
as 12,000 to as many as 35 million 40 grain, .22 caliber longrifle
bullets." 29 Earhart was executed before the NAS Report was
published. 30
In 2003, a federal district court excluded CBLA evidence under the
Daubert standard. 31 This was apparently the first case to rule such
evidence inadmissible.
25

National Research Council, supra note 11, at 7.

26

Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991) ("He concluded
that the likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same batch, based on a//
the .22 bullets made in one year, is approximately .000025 percent, 'give or take a
zero.' He subsequently acknowledged, however, that the numbers which he used to
reach the .000025 percent statistic failed to take into account that there are different
types of .22 caliber bullets made each year - .22, .22 long, and .22 long rifle. Agent
Riley ultimately testified that there could be several hundred thousand bullets per
batch, but with some variation in the elemental composition within the batch.")
(emphasis added).
27

See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 1998) (denying habeas
relief, the court referred to "the significant role the bullet evidence played in the
prosecution's case").
28

Testimony of John Riley, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee County, 21st
Judicial Dist., Texas, Transcript at 5248-49. See also id. at 5258 ("Well, bullets that
are - that have analytically indistinguishable compositions or compositions that are
generally similar typically are found within the same box of ammunition and that is the
case that we have here. Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be
found in other boxes of ammunition, but it's most lil<ely those boxes would have been
manufactured at the same place on or about the same date.''). But see testimony of
Charles Peters, FBI examiner, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002
(Daubert hearing: "We have never testified, to my knowledge, that that bullet came
from that box. We'd never say that. All we are testifying is that that bullet, or that
victim fragment or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes
that were produced at the same time." Transcript at 1-2.) (emphasis added).
29

National Research Council, supra note 11, at 6.

30

See Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions,
http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (search for "Earhart" under "Find
Person" search box) (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
31

310

U.S. v. Mikos, 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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D.

Withholding Data
Much of the FBI testimony rested on a database that the Bureau
had built up over the course of many years. Although the NAS Committee frequently asked for this data during its year-long investigation,
the FBI did not turn over the data until it was too late to include an
analysis of the information in its report. 32 Karen Kafadar and Cliff H.
Spiegelman, the two statisticians who served on the NAS Committee,
would later write that their subsequent inspection of the data "identified several peculiarities." 33 First, the database was incomplete. The
FBI claimed to have a "complete data file" of some 71 ,000+ measurements but only 64,869 were turned over. Moreover, only measurements made by ICP-AES were included; a different analytical method,
NAA, haq been used before 1997. Both techniques measured the
same elements, and therefore the results from either technique would
have been suitable for comparison. Further, the numbering system for
the bullets was "highly inconsistent and rather unexpected," suggesting that some bullet measurements had been deleted. 34 Additionally, "a
rough investigation of the measurement error indicated many measurement errors that exceeded the FBI's claimed analytical precision of
2-5%." 35 Finally, "only 15% of the 1,079 cases listed in these two files
had measurements from [National Institute of Standards and T echnology] . . . [,] making it impossible to determine the frequency of
32

See Cliff H. Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Integrity and the Scientific
Method: The Case for Bullet Lead Data as Forensic Evidence, 19:2 Chance 16, 22
(2006) ("During the open sessions of the committee meetings, the FBI claimed to have
a 'complete data file' of some 71 ,000+ measurements. Following repeated requests
from the Committee, the FBI submitted at its last meeting a CD-ROM that contained
two data files with a combined total of 64,869 bullet (not 71 ,000+) measurement
records. . . . This data set could not be analyzed in time for the release of the report
...").
33

Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32.

34

Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32 ("[nhe numbering system of the bullets
was highly inconsistent and rather unexpected, e.g., the bullets from a suspect in a
particular case might be numbered 013A, 013B, 013C, 014A, 014B, 014C, ... ,
leading one to wonder what happened to bullets 001, 002, ... , 012."). Other illustrations of incomplete data were noted: "[W]hile most of the bullets indicated 3
measurements, about 30 bullets had six or more measurements." ld. "[O]nly about
50% of the bullets in this data set were identified as having come from one of the four
major bullet manufacturers in the United States (Cascade Cartridge, Inc.; Federal;
Remington; Winchester); the 'complete data file' of 71,000 bullets may yield a higher
proportion of bullets from these four manufacturers." ld.
35

Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32.

© 2011 Thomson Reuters e Criminal Law Bulletin e Vol. 47 No. 2
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'matches'" in some cases. 36 Accordingly, the "missing data and the
inconsistent precisions" undermined the Bureau's public claims. 37
As researchers steeped in the traditions of science, Kafadar and
Spiegelman were puzzled by the FBI's failure to disclose this data.
They wrote: "The scientific method is important for science generally;
forensic science is no exception. . . . [T]he evidence in this paper
suggest that, at least tor [CBLA], forensic science tailed in the requirement to share the material, methods and data to reach conclusions
with the scientific community." 38
In short, the NAS Committee, appointed at the behest of and funded
by the FBI, was not provided with critical data that would have assisted it in evaluating the technique. This data formed the basis of the
Bureau's testimony in about 500 pr_osecutions, including death penalty
cases. 39
E.

66

SiJ:PDII'illl'ilD/J'il$2t Uoe Sdem;e
The FBI's response to the NAS Report was also disconcerting. The
Bureau quickly put out a press release, obscuring the report's findings.
The release highlighted the NAS Committee's conclusion that the FBI
was using appropria_te instrumentation and the correct elements for

comparison. Yet these aspects of CBLA were not the ones in question.
Rather, the interpretation of the data was the disputed issue. Only one
sentence in the press release addressed this important issue: "Recommendations by the [NAS] include suggestions to improve the statisticai
analysis, quality control procedures, as well as expert testimony." 40
The news media read the report quite differently - e.g., "Study Shoots
Holes in Bullet Analysis By FBI," 41 "Report Finds Flaws," 42 "Panel
36
37

38

Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32.
Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 32.
Spiegelman & l<afadar, supra note 32, at 22-23.

39

See Paui C. Gianneiii, Wrongtui Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 198-203 (2007) (discussing CBLA).
40

Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Feb. 10, 2004.

41

fV1aurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analysis By FBI, Chi. Trib., Feb.
11, 2004, at 14.
42

Charles Pillar, Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis; Changes are Proposed
for the Technique Often Cited in Expert Testimony in Criminal Trials, L.A. Times, Feb.
11, 2004, at 12.
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Questions FBI Bullet Analysis," 43 and "Report Questions the Reliability
of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test." 44
The Bureau also included the following passage in the press release:
"The basis of bullet lead compositional analysis is supported by approximately 50 peer-reviewed articles found in scientific publications
beginning in the early 1970's. Published research and validation studies have continued to demonstrate the usefulness of the measurements of trace elements within bullet lead." 45 In contrast, the NAS
Report pointed out that there were "very few peer-reviewed articles
on homogeneity and the rate of false positive matches" and "outside
reviews have only recently been published." 46 In effect, the FBI cherrypicked favorable statements from the report and .downplayed the
unfavorable crucial findings.
Over a year after the release of the NAS study, the FBI discontinued
CBLA testing, 47 issuing another slanted press release. Once again, the
release minimized the problems, citing the following reason for its
decision: "While the FBI Laboratory still firmly supports the scientific
foundation of bullet lead analysis, given the costs of maintaining the
equipment, the resources necessary to do the examination, and its
relative probative value, the FBI Laboratory has decided that it will no
longer conduct this exam." 48 Nevertheless, a month earlier, Dwight
Adams, the laboratory director, had written a memorandum to the FBI
Director specifying different reasons for abandoning the technique,
including the following comments: (1) "We cannot afford to be misleading to a jury" and (2) "We plan to discourage prosecutors from using
our previous results in future cases." 49 Neither concern was reflected
in the press release.
In the wake of the National Academy's report, several state courts
excluded CBLA evidence. 50 Surprisingly, the FBI supplied affidavits in
several cases supporting prosecutors' efforts to sustain convictions
43

Randolph E. Schmid, Panel Questions FBI Bullet Analysis, Associated Press,
Feb. 10, 2004.
44

Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 2004, at 22.
45

FBI News Release, supra note 40.

46

National Research Council, supra note 11, at 100.

47

Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets From Crime Scene,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2005, at A 12.
48

Department of Justice, FBI News Release, Sept. 1, 2005.

49

John Solomon, FBI's Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2007, at

A1.
50

See Ragland v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting that "[i]f the FBI
Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now considers such evidence to be of
© 2011 Thomson Reuters • Criminal Law Bulletin • Vol. 47 No. 2
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based on the technique. In one affidavit, the FBI cited the Academy's
report but failed to mention that the report had faulted the Bureau's
statistical methods. The chair of the NAS Committee criticized the affidavit because it did "not discuss the statistical bullet-matching
technique, which is key and probably the most significant scientific
flaw found by the committee." 51 The affidavit was also misleading
because it estimated that the maximum number of .22-caliber bullets
in a batch of lead was 1.3 million, when the NAS Committee found that
the number could be as high as 35 million. 52
On November i8, 2007, 60 Minutes aired a segment on CBLA. In
an interview for 60 Minutes, the FBI lab director, now retired,
acknowledged that testimony about boxes was "misleading and
inappropriate." 53 That broadcast, along with a Washington Post
investigation, called into question the FBI's response to the NAS
Report. The main problem was that only the FBI had records of all the
cases in which its experts had testified, and the Bureau had declined
to disclose the names of those cases. 5 4 Instead, the· ·Bureau relied on
the NAS Report, its own press releases, and pro forma letters sent to
prosecution and defense organizations to notify defendants that the
prosecution experts had relied upon faulty science. Yet the letters
neither highlighted the problem, nor its significance, and therefore
were grossly inadequate means of communication, especially for
insufficient reliability to justify continuing to produce it, a finding by the trial court that
the evidence is both scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous");
Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 896 A.2d I 059, I 070, I 078 (2006) ("CBLA is not
admissible under the Frye-Reed standard because it is not generally accepted within
the scientific community as valid and reliable."; "Based on the criticism of the
processes and assumptions underlying CBLA, we determine that the trial court erred
in admitting expert testimony based on CBLA because of the lack of general acceptance of the process in the scientific community."); State v. Behn, 375 N.J. Super.
409, 868 A.2d 329, 331 (App. Div. 2005) (finding the technique was "based on erroneous scientific foundations").
But see Com. v. Fisher, 582 Pa. 276, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (2005) ("The CBAL
evidence, at best, established a possible connection between Appellant and the bullets recovered from the victirn's body."). See also U.S. v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 509
(8th Cir. 2005) ("Davis's trial counsel cannot be said to be ineffective for failing to
challenge the FBI's methodology on a basis that was not advanced by the scientific
community at the time of trial.").
51

Solomon, supra note 49 (quoting Ken MacFadden).
. note 29.
ee supra tex t accompanying

52s

53

60 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice (CBS television broadcast Nov. 18, 2007).

54

Solomon, supra note 49, at A I ("Hundreds of defendants sitting in prisons
nationwide have been convicted with the help of an FBI forensic tool that was
discarded more than two years ago. But the FBI lab has yet to take steps to alert the
affected defendants or courts, even as the window for appealing convictions is closing
... ").
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prisoners without attorneys. 55 A few days after the 60 Minutes expose,
Senator Patrick Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to the FBI Director, noting that the Bureau's letters
gave "the false impression that these discredited tests had continuing
reliability. " 56
Conclusion
Several lessons can be gleaned from the CBLA experience. First,
the failure to publish the empirical data that supports scientific conclusions is unacceptable. Scientists "are generally expected to exchange
research data as well as unique research materials that are essential
to the replication or extension of reported findings." 57 Second, defense
attorneys were unable to successfully challenge the evidence until
Tobin, the retired FBI expert, became a defense witness. This is not
surprising because no defendant, no matter how rich, can conduct
extensive empirical studies. A defense expert in a particular case can
critique the bases of a prosecution expert's opinion but can rarely
replicate the research upon which that opinion rests. 58
55

The Innocence Network and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers have formed a task force and are working with the FBI to contact defense
attorneys and convicts. See Vesna Jaksic, Faulty Bullet-test Cases Finding Way to
Court, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 2008 ("The task force is lining up pro bono commitments
from several law firms to handle the cases.").
56

John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers; Attorney General Is
Told to Prepare For Senate Inquiry, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2007, at A2. Leahy also
wrote: "The new revelations about bullet-lead analysis are just the latest examples of
the Department's inadequate efforts to ensure that sound forensic testing is utilized to
the maximum extent to find the guilty rather than merely obtain a conviction. Punishing
the innocent is wrong and allows the guilty party to remain free." ld.
57

National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences, Responsible Science 11 (1992). See also National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences,
Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials: Responsibilities of Authorship in the
Life Sciences 4 (2003) (advocating a "uniform principle for sharing integral data and
materials expeditiously" or UPSIDE).
58

See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305, 1329-30
(2004).
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